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Summary
The 107th Congress is considering revisions to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), which is the major federal statute guaranteeing free
appropriate public education (FAPE) for children with disabilities and authorizing
state grants to help fund special education and related services for these children.
Among the areas that could be considered is the funding of the state grants programs
— especially the “full funding” of the Part B grants-to-states program.  This report
examines the formulas for the three IDEA state grants programs:  the grants-to-states
program, which serves mostly school-aged children with disabilities, the preschool
program (Section 619), which serves children with disabilities ages 3 to 5, and the
infants and toddlers program (Part C), which serves children from birth to age 2.
The report concentrates on the formula provisions of the Part B grants-to-states
program, which accounts for most of the funds appropriated for IDEA.  After
providing for various set-asides amounting to about 2% of the total appropriations
for this program, the Secretary of Education allocates a base-year grant to each state,
which is the amount a state received for FY1999.  Of the remaining amount ($3.3
billion for FY2002), 85% is initially allocated based on states’ shares of the
preschool- and school-age population, and 15% is allocated based on states’ shares
of children in the above age group living in poverty.  Finally, when appropriations
are growing (as they have been in recent years) state allotments are adjusted so that
the growth rate of each state’s grant closely follows the growth in the overall
appropriations for the grants-to-states program.  For example, total FY2002
appropriations for the grants-to-states program grew by 18.8%.  The state formula
limited state grant growth rates to a range between 17.3% and 20.3%.  The substate
formula for the grants-to-states program is based on similar principles, as are the state
and substate formulas for the IDEA preschool state grants program.  The Part C
formula differs from and is less complex than the Part B formulas.  Funds for Part C
grants are distributed based on states’ share of infants and toddlers — i.e., total
population below the age of 3.  There is a one-half percent minimum state grant
amount for the Part C formula.
In recent years, Congress has been particularly concerned about funding for
special education, which has resulted in substantial increases in funding of the grants
to states program, from $2.3 billion in FY1996 to $7.5 billion in FY2002.  Despite
recent increases, some Members of Congress have also been concerned that
appropriations are still far from providing full funding, i.e., maximum state grants
authorized by the statute.  The Senate version of the No Child Left Behind Act would
have appropriated estimated full-funding amounts by FY2007.  The final bill did not
contain this proposal, in part because some Members argued that IDEA needs to be
significantly revised before full funding could be justified.  Those revisions are now
being considered.  The report concludes with a discussion of possible unanticipated
and unintended consequences of providing full funding for grants to states.  This
report will not be updated.
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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA):  State Grant Formulas
Overview
The 107th Congress is considering whether to make revisions to the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which is the major federal statute
guaranteeing free appropriate public education (FAPE) for children with disabilities
and authorizing state grants to help fund special education and related services for
these children.1  Among the areas that could be considered is the funding of the state
grants programs — especially the “full funding” of the Part B grants-to-states
program.
This report examines the formulas for the three IDEA state grants programs:  the
grants-to-states program, which serves mostly school-aged children with disabilities,
the preschool program (Section 619), which serves children with disabilities ages 3
to 5, and the infants and toddlers program (Part C), which serves children from birth
to age 2.  As background to the discussion of specific IDEA formulas, the report
begins with an overview of the basic characteristics of federal state grant formulas.
The report then outlines the three IDEA state grant formulas.  It concentrates on the
Part B grants-to-states formula (funding programs mostly for school-age children
with disabilities) because it is the most complicated and deals with the most money.
The report concludes with a discussion and current status of the debate over “full
funding” of the grants-to-states formula, i.e., the provision of maximum state grants
under this formula.
Overview of Characteristics of State Formula Grants
Formula Factors.  In general, federal grant formulas have one or more factors
that are used to make initial allocations.  (As discussed below, these initial grants are
then usually adjusted before making final allocations.)  These factors usually reflect
the grant’s target population or populations and might include, for example,
population and poverty for a targeted age group.  Initial allocations are made to states
based on their shares of each formula factor.  For example, suppose a state formula
allocated $1 billion based on total population, with no other requirements.  If
California has 12% of total population, California would receive 12% of the funds
or $120 million.  If Vermont has 0.2% of total population, Vermont would receive
0.2% of the funds or $2 million.
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2Specifically the total amount needed to bring states up to the minimum grant level is
determined.  Then that amount is obtained by reducing all other states’ allocations
proportionally.
Minimum Grants or Stop Loss.  Formulas often specify minimum grant
provisions so that, assuming funds are sufficient, no grantee receives less than a
certain amount.  These minimums tend to range from 0.25% to 0.5% of the total
allocation.  If the above example included a minimum grant of 0.25%, Vermont,
Wyoming, and a few other states would have their grants boosted to $2.5 million.
If the minimum were at 0.5%, other, somewhat larger, states (for example, New
Hampshire, which has about 0.45% of total population) would see higher grants (in
New Hampshire’s case going from $4.5 million to $5 million).
Another reason for minimum grants in formulas is to prevent sudden program
dislocations and accompanying political controversies when a new formula goes into
effect or when formula factors are updated, e.g., when new census figures become
available.  Sometimes this is a guarantee (if funds are sufficient) of a prior year grant
amount or a percentage of a prior grant.  In other cases, it is tied to the overall
percentage change in appropriations.  These minimum grants are sometimes called
hold harmless provisions, because they hold grant recipients harmless at some
previous grant level.
Because money to raise states to minimum grant levels almost always comes
from the states’ grants that are above the minimum,2 Congress sometimes puts
constraints on minimums so that the full minimum grant is not received.  This is
illustrated in the example discussed below.
Maximum Grants or Stop Gain.  Less often except with respect to
minimum grants, formulas constrain how much states’ grants can grow from year to
year.  The main reason for such provisions is to further dampen the impacts of a new
formula going into effect.  One approach is to limit the percentage gain from one year
to the next, which is discussed in the following example.
A Hypothetical Example.  Table 1 shows a simple hypothetical example of
how a state formula (based on total population) might be constrained by a small state
minimum (0.25%), a hold harmless (95%) of a prior grant, and a maximum grant
(110% of a prior grant).  To illustrate the effects of these formula alternatives, Table
1 presents states’ percentage shares of total appropriation, rather than dollar amounts.
A state share can be translated into dollars by multiplying the share by the total
allocation.  For example, California’s population accounts for about 12.036% of total
U.S. population, as determined by the 2000 census.  If total population were the only
formula factor with no adjustments and $1 billion were allocated, California would
receive 12.036% of $1 billion or $120.36 million.  Wyoming’s share of 2000 total
population is 0.175%.  From a $1 billion allocation with no minimum grant,
Wyoming would receive $1.75 million.
CRS-3
3These state shares are based on total population from the 1990 and 2000 census and were
obtained from the Census Bureau website at:[http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/
phc-t2/tab01.pdf].
4The states that are slightly larger than these five smaller states appear to have the same
shares in columns 2 and 3.  In fact, their shares are lower in column 3, but these reductions
do not show up because only 3 decimal places are shown.  For example, South Dakota’s
share is reduced from 0.26823% to 0.26767%.
5The states held harmless are the slowest growing states West Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, Ohio, Iowa, New York, Massachusetts, Louisiana, and
Michigan.
Column 1 of Table 1 shows each state’s share of the total allocation based on
its share of total 1990 population.  Column 2 shows the 2000 shares.3  The next
column (column 3) shows the result when a minimum grant of 0.25% of the total
allocation is required.  That is, no state would receive a share of the total allocation
that was less than 0.25% of the total allocated amount.  In the case of a $1 billion
total allocation, this would result in no state receiving less than $2.5 million.  This
can be seen in the box at the bottom of the table in which the five smallest states,
which originally had shares ranging from 0.175% to 0.228%, now have shares of
0.25%.  The funds to raise these five states to the minimum are taken proportionally
from the other states.  Note that other states have slightly lower shares.  For example,
California’s share is reduced from 12.036% to 12.011%.4
In addition to minimum grants to ensure that grants to smaller states are large
enough to be effective, federal formulas often have minimum state grant amounts
(i.e., hold harmless levels) to ensure that no state loses an unacceptable amount when
a new formula takes effect or when updated data (for example, when more recent
census data) become available.  Column 4 of Table 1 shows one such example.  Here
the minimum share a state can receive is the greater of the 0.25% minimum or 95%
of the state’s share of total population in 1990.  The data for New York illustrate the
impact of the latter provision.  In column 3, New York’s share is 6.729%.  In column
4, its share is increased to 6.872%, which is 95% of its 1990 share of 7.234%.  Again
funds to raise New York and other states to this ‘hold harmless’ level come from all
other states, except from those at the 0.25% minimum.  Notice, for example, that
California’s share again is slightly reduced while Wyoming’s share remains at
0.25%.5
Besides the minimum grants discussed above, column 5 shows the impact of a
formula provision that restricts a state’s growth.  In this case, no state receives a
percentage share that is more than 110% of its 1990 share.  This restricts increases
for states experiencing high population growth, such as Georgia, Arizona, Nevada,
and Colorado.  For example, Georgia’s 2000 share under the previous formulas
ranged between 2.91% and 2.875%.  However, these shares are more than 110% of
Georgia’s 1990 share of 2.6%.  So under the formula shown in column 5, Georgia’s
share is reduced to 2.865%, which is 110% of its 1990 share.  In addition to
constraining increases for high growth states, a cap, ceiling, or maximum grant can
reduce the impact of a small state minimum requirement.  This effect can be seen for
some of the states that would receive 0.25% of total appropriations without any
restriction on growth of a state grant (see the box at the bottom of column 5).  If a
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0.25% share is greater than 110% of the 1990 share, a state’s final share is reduced
to the 110% cap (as it is for Alaska, Vermont, and Wyoming).  If the 110% cap is
greater than 0.25% share, the state retains that share (see North Dakota and the
District of Columbia).
Table 1. Illustrative State Formula Based on 1990 and 2000 Total
Population
(States are sorted according their shares of total 2000 population)
































95% of the 1990
share but no share
greater than
110% of the 1990
share
column numbers
1 2 3 4 5
California 11.966% 12.036% 12.011% 11.896% 11.992%
Texas 6.830% 7.410% 7.394% 7.323% 7.382%
New York 7.234% 6.743% 6.729% 6.872% 6.872%
Florida 5.202% 5.679% 5.667% 5.613% 5.658%
Illinois 4.596% 4.413% 4.404% 4.366% 4.397%
Pennsylvania 4.777% 4.364% 4.355% 4.538% 4.538%
Ohio 4.361% 4.034% 4.026% 4.143% 4.143%
Michigan 3.737% 3.532% 3.524% 3.551% 3.551%
New Jersey 3.108% 2.990% 2.984% 2.955% 2.979%
Georgia 2.605% 2.909% 2.903% 2.875% 2.865%
North Carolina 2.665% 2.860% 2.854% 2.827% 2.850%
Virginia 2.488% 2.515% 2.510% 2.486% 2.506%
Massachusetts 2.419% 2.256% 2.251% 2.298% 2.298%
Indiana 2.229% 2.161% 2.156% 2.136% 2.153%
Washington 1.957% 2.094% 2.090% 2.070% 2.087%
Tennessee 1.961% 2.022% 2.018% 1.998% 2.014%
Missouri 2.057% 1.988% 1.984% 1.965% 1.981%
Wisconsin 1.967% 1.906% 1.902% 1.884% 1.899%
Maryland 1.923% 1.882% 1.878% 1.860% 1.875%
Arizona 1.474% 1.823% 1.819% 1.802% 1.621%
Minnesota 1.759% 1.748% 1.745% 1.728% 1.742%
Louisiana 1.697% 1.588% 1.585% 1.612% 1.612%
Alabama 1.625% 1.580% 1.577% 1.562% 1.574%
Colorado 1.325% 1.528% 1.525% 1.511% 1.457%
Kentucky 1.482% 1.436% 1.433% 1.420% 1.431%
South Carolina 1.402% 1.426% 1.423% 1.409% 1.420%
Oklahoma 1.265% 1.226% 1.224% 1.212% 1.222%
Oregon 1.143% 1.216% 1.213% 1.202% 1.211%
Connecticut 1.322% 1.210% 1.208% 1.256% 1.256%
Iowa 1.117% 1.040% 1.038% 1.061% 1.061%

































95% of the 1990
share but no share
greater than
110% of the 1990
share
column numbers
1 2 3 4 5
6P.L. 105-17.
Kansas 0.996% 0.955% 0.953% 0.946% 0.952%
Arkansas 0.945% 0.950% 0.948% 0.939% 0.947%
Utah 0.693% 0.794% 0.792% 0.784% 0.762%
Nevada 0.483% 0.710% 0.709% 0.702% 0.532%
New Mexico 0.609% 0.646% 0.645% 0.639% 0.644%
West Virginia 0.721% 0.643% 0.641% 0.685% 0.685%
Nebraska 0.635% 0.608% 0.607% 0.603% 0.606%
Idaho 0.405% 0.460% 0.459% 0.454% 0.445%
Maine 0.494% 0.453% 0.452% 0.469% 0.469%
New Hampshire 0.446% 0.439% 0.438% 0.434% 0.438%
Hawaii 0.446% 0.431% 0.430% 0.426% 0.429%
Rhode Island 0.403% 0.373% 0.372% 0.383% 0.383%
Montana 0.321% 0.321% 0.320% 0.317% 0.319%
Delaware 0.268% 0.278% 0.278% 0.275% 0.277%
South Dakota 0.280% 0.268% 0.268% 0.266% 0.267%
North Dakota 0.257% 0.228% 0.250% 0.250% 0.250%
Alaska 0.221% 0.223% 0.250% 0.250% 0.243%
Vermont 0.226% 0.216% 0.250% 0.250% 0.249%
District of
Columbia 0.244% 0.203% 0.250% 0.250% 0.250%
Wyoming 0.182% 0.175% 0.250% 0.250% 0.201%
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
The IDEA State Grants Formulas
This section deals with the three IDEA state formulas:  the Part B grants-to-
states formula, which funds special education mostly for school-age children with
disabilities, the Part B preschool state grants (Section 619), and the infants and
toddlers program (Part C).  The Part B grants-to-states formula is the focus here
because it allocates by far the largest share of the IDEA appropriation ($7.5 billion
of an $8.7 billion appropriation for FY2002) and is the most complex of the three
IDEA formulas.
Part B Grants-to-States Formula.  Prior to the 1997 Amendments,6 Part
B funds were distributed to states essentially based on state shares of children with
disabilities served.  Testimony during reauthorization by the Inspector General of
the U.S. Department of Education (ED) raised concerns that the formula created
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be counted for purposes of the formula — but not regarding who must be served.
8The outlying areas are American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Virgin Islands.
9Two states have a maximum age of 18, two states have 19 as the maximum age, 26 states
have a maximum age of 20, and 22 states have a maximum age of 21.
incentives to over-identify children with disabilities.7  The solution to this problem
was to change to a “census-based” formula.  The decision was to base the formula
mostly on population (and to a lesser extent on poverty, because there is at least
some relationship between poverty and the incidence of disabilities).  However,
switching completely to such a formula would have significantly redistributed IDEA
funds.  So the Congress decided to delay implementation of the permanent formula
until overall Part B funds surpassed $4.9 billion, which happened in FY2000.
Congress also included various provisions to dampen the impact of the formula
change, once it went into effect.
Table 2 illustrates how the IDEA “permanent” formula works under current
conditions when appropriations are growing.  The left-hand column shows the
formula provision; the right-hand column shows the resulting amount or percentage
for FY2002.  The overall FY2002 appropriations for Part B grants to states is about
$7.5 billion — an 18.8% increase over the FY2001 amount.  This percentage
increase is important to keep in mind for purposes of the formula.
Prior to allocating funds to the states, the Secretary first reserves funds from
total appropriations for the outlying areas,8 for the Secretary of the Interior for
services for children with disabilities attending Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
schools, and for studies and evaluation.  The combination of these set-asides
currently amounts to less than 2% of the total appropriation for the grants to states
program or about $132 million.
After accounting for these set-asides, the Secretary allocates for each state the
amount it received in FY1999.  This is the base-year part of the grant because
FY1999 was the last year before the permanent formula went into effect.  These
amounts will not change unless appropriations drop drastically but will account for
less and less of the total grant if appropriations grow significantly.  The total amount
is about $4.2 billion, which is about 57% of the amount allocated to states for
FY2002.  Of the remaining amount ($3.3 billion for FY2002), 85% is initially
allocated based on states’ shares of total population within the age range in which
the state provides FAPE to children with disabilities.  Thus the age range for the
population (and for poverty) vary from state to state depending on the age at which
services cease (all states begin services at 3).9  The remaining 15% is allocated based
on states’ shares of children in the above age group living in poverty.  The initial
allocation then is the base grant plus the 85% allocation based on population plus
the 15% allocation based on poverty.
There are several minimum grant constraints — not all of which come into play
under current conditions when appropriations are growing significantly.  Assuming
sufficient funds are appropriated, no state shall receive a grant less than the greater
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of the following amounts (that is, the minimum grant amount — subject to further
formula provisions discussed below — is the largest of these values):
1. A state’s prior year grant — with current large increases, this
minimum will be less than other minimums and will not have an
impact.
2. A state’s base year grant plus one-third percent of the increase
between the current year (FY2002, for this example) and the base
year (FY1999).  This adds about $10.7 million to the base grant for
FY2002.  This would increase grants of the smallest states by as
much as 50%, but these increases are capped by the maximum gain
discussed below.
3. An increase not less than the overall percentage increase minus 1.5
percentage points (for FY2002 this is 18.8% - 1.5% = 17.3%)
4. An increase that is not less than 90% of the overall percentage
increase.  For FY2002 this is 18.8% times 90% = 16.9%, which is
less than the 17.3%; so this minimum grant is superseded under
FY2002 appropriations. However, if the Bush Administration’s
proposed increase of $1 billion over the FY2002 amount were
adopted for FY2003, this would be about 13.3% increase, and this
minimum would come into play (that is, a minimum growth rate of
11.95% rather than 11.8%, which would be the minimum increase
under number 3 above).
Table 2.  Provisions of IDEA Part B Grants to States Permanent
Formula
Formula provision Relevant data for FY2002
From amounts appropriated under Section 611(j) $7,528,533,000
(18.8% increase over FY2001
total)
Secretary to reserve certain amounts for outlying areas,
Indians, and studies and evaluations
$132,767,773
Allocate the remainder to the states as follows: $7,395,765,227
  1.  Allocate to each state its FY1999 grant (base grant) $4,212,274,136
  2.  Of the remainder, allocate 85% based on each  state’s    
       share of total population within the age group 3 to 21     
       for which the state provides free appropriate public        
       education (FAPE)
$2,705,967,427
  3.  Of the remainder, allocate 15% based on each state’s     
       share of population living in poverty within the age        
       group 3 to 21 for which the state provides FAPE
$477,523,664
  4.  Ensure that no state receives a grant which is less than   
       the largest of these amounts:
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Formula provision Relevant data for FY2002
10Some states will not get these exact amounts — most likely those not at the floor or ceiling
amounts.
            a. Its prior year grant With large increases, this is
unlikely to have an effect
            b. Its base year grant plus one-third percent of the     
                increase in total  appropriations between the          
                current year and the base year
In FY02 this is the base grant +
$10.7 million. Is likely to be
reduced by the maximum grant
discussed below
            c. A grant amount that increases not less than the      
                increase in overall appropriations minus 1.5          
                percentage points
Not less than a 17.3% increase
(18.8% -1.5%)
            d. A grant amount that increases not less than 90%   
                of the increase in overall appropriations
Not less than a 16.9% increase
(18.8% times 90%). Only comes
into effect when percentage
growth of appropriations is less
than 15%. Would be particularly
important if appropriations were
to grow by only 2% or 3%
  5. Ensure that no state receives a grant which is more than  
      the lesser of these amounts:
               a. A grant amount that increased not less than the   
                   increase in overall appropriations plus 1.5          
                   percentage points
No more than a 20.3% increase
(18.8% +1.5%)
               b. A state’s maximum grant may not be more than  
                   40% of the national average per pupil                 
                   expenditure (APPE) times the number of            
                   children with disabilities served ages 3 to 21.
The national total level for this
ceiling for FY2002 is estimated
to be $18,203,992,000.  This
provision has no effect for
FY2002.
There are two maximum grant constraints:
1. No state may receive an increase that is more than the overall
percentage increase in total appropriations plus 1.5 percentage points
(18.8% + 1.5% = 20.3% for FY2002) and
2. The ultimate maximum grant for a state, which is 40% of the
national APPE times the number of children with disabilities served.
Only the first maximum is currently in effect.  The ultimate maximum state grant
amount is discussed further below.
Table 3 shows final allocations for FY2000 based on appropriations of nearly
$5 billion, FY2001 allocations based on appropriations of $6.3 billion, and
preliminary allocations10 calculated by ED for FY2002 based on appropriations of
$7.5 billion.  The column at the right shows the percentage change from FY2001 to
FY2002.  Notice that many states received a 20.3% increase (about one-half of all
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states).  About one-quarter received a 17.3% increase.  And the remaining states
received  percentage increases between these two percentages.  These changes
reflect the minimum and maximum grant provisions discussed above:  the
maximum percentage change over the total change in appropriations (18.8%) plus
1.5 percentage points (20.3%) and the minimum percentage change of 18.8% minus
1.5 percentage points (17.3%).











Alabama $79,372,913 $100,426,123 $119,993,708 19.5%
Alaska 14,360,167 18,460,830 22,199,605 20.3%
Arizona 71,831,645 92,343,757 111,045,656 20.3%
Arkansas 46,925,276 59,842,674 71,962,298 20.3%
California 505,630,798 650,017,799 781,662,507 20.3%
Colorado 60,836,940 78,209,425 94,048,771 20.3%
Connecticut 60,621,805 76,114,202 89,245,788 17.3%
Delaware 13,161,054 16,919,300 20,345,877 20.3%
District of Columbia 6,617,417 8,507,074 10,229,967 20.3%
Florida 274,310,784 344,413,144 405,996,094 17.9%
Georgia 126,278,991 162,338,988 195,216,655 20.3%
Hawaii 16,598,674 21,338,561 25,660,148 20.3%
Idaho 22,338,848 28,717,888 34,533,972 20.3%
Illinois 222,970,401 283,066,424 336,544,669 18.9%
Indiana 115,783,816 145,373,315 170,908,661 17.6%
Iowa 56,057,887 70,383,938 82,526,911 17.3%
Kansas 46,805,142 60,170,732 70,916,463 17.9%
Kentucky 69,988,093 88,537,364 104,534,421 18.1%
Louisiana 77,220,761 99,271,780 119,376,775 20.3%
Maine 25,125,639 31,546,701 36,989,288 17.3%
Maryland 88,552,235 111,365,477 131,488,699 18.1%
Massachusetts 130,345,374 163,656,198 191,890,947 17.3%
Michigan 168,624,335 216,776,390 260,222,966 20.0%
Minnesota 85,579,363 109,440,436 128,321,623 17.3%
Mississippi 49,937,502 64,197,563 77,199,160 20.3%
Missouri 103,938,330 130,959,742 153,553,541 17.3%
Montana 15,239,841 19,591,702 23,559,507 20.3%
Nebraska 34,286,654 43,048,888 50,475,888 17.3%
Nevada 27,013,687 34,727,666 41,760,879 20.3%
New Hampshire 21,791,090 27,359,981 32,080,256 17.3%
New Jersey 165,972,682 208,388,355 244,340,509 17.3%
New Mexico 41,240,344 52,531,899 61,594,953 17.3%
New York 342,212,717 429,667,970 509,444,136 18.6%
North Carolina 132,570,043 169,440,174 202,782,236 19.7%
North Dakota 10,686,617 13,738,268 16,520,608 20.3%
Ohio 186,600,288 239,885,523 288,468,284 20.3%
Oklahoma 64,473,544 81,913,464 98,502,970 20.3%
Oregon 56,238,461 72,297,813 86,419,290 19.5%
Pennsylvania 183,436,695 235,280,772 281,605,665 19.7%
Rhode Island 20,079,813 25,211,373 29,560,959 17.3%
South Carolina 78,237,560 98,231,807 115,463,825 17.5%
South Dakota 12,730,542 16,365,852 19,680,342 20.3%
Tennessee 101,635,101 128,733,463 154,805,179 20.3%
Texas 393,361,010 505,688,457 608,102,898 20.3%
Utah 44,372,041 57,042,839 68,595,427 20.3%
Vermont 10,303,939 13,246,313 15,929,020 20.3%
Virginia 121,999,520 153,996,278 181,315,881 17.7%












West Virginia 34,872,055 43,783,893 51,337,699 17.3%
Wisconsin 92,662,516 117,131,369 140,642,706 20.1%
Wyoming 10,809,853 13,896,695 16,711,120 20.3%
American Samoa 4,956,510 5,127,424 5,286,455 3.1%
Guam 11,974,852 12,387,778 12,651,196 3.1%
Northern Mariana Islands 3,056,556 3,161,954 3,229,191 3.1%
Puerto Rico 43,909,097 56,447,698 67,879,755 20.3%
Virgin Islands 9,078,705 9,391,764 9,591,474 3.1%
Palau 0 0 0 —
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 —
Micronesia 0 0 0 —
Indian Tribe Set Aside 61,173,538 77,724,538 79,377,301 2.1%
Othera 20,636,845 23,244,059 21,629,000 -6.9%
Total $4,989,685,0 $6,339,685,0 $7,528,533,0 18.8%
Source:  ED Budget Service.
aIncludes funding for Studies and Evaluations and a competition for Pacific Basin Entities.
Impact of Changes in the IDEA Grants-to-State Formula.  As noted
above, the new “permanent” formula for the grants-to-states program went into
effect in FY2000.  Because overall appropriations for this program have been
growing significantly in recent years and because the formula constrains growth
rates of individual states’ grants, little notice apparently has been taken of changes
resulting from the formula change.  FY2002 appropriations represent about a 51%
increase over the FY2000 amount and about a 75% increase over the FY1999
amount.  Because of constraints on growth rates under the new formula, increases
in state grants over the last 2 years have ranged from about 48% to about 54%.
At the same time, some states’ allocations could have been significantly
different under other formula alternatives.  Table 4 shows estimated percentage
changes under three alternatives to the current formula.  The first alternative shows
changes if the previous formula had been maintained, that is, if funds were
distributed based on states’ shares of number of children with disabilities served.
Under that approach several states, for example, a number of New England states,
would have received significantly larger grants.  Some other states, such as Alaska,
Louisiana, Montana, and Texas, do better under the current formula than they would
under the pre-FY2000 formula.
The second alternative shows changes if the new formula were implemented
with no constraints on growth rates.  That is, each state would receive its FY1999
grant amount plus 85% of the remainder distributed based on population and 15%
based on poverty.  No constraints would be placed on how much or how little a
state’s grant could grow.  This approach would benefit certain states, such as
Arizona and Colorado.  Other states that do not benefit from a population-poverty
formula would have lower grant amounts — for example, Massachusetts and New
Jersey.
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The third alternative distributes 85% of all funds based on population and 15%
of all funds based on poverty, with no minimum or maximum grants.  This approach
benefits states, such as California and Nevada but is less advantageous for states
such as Connecticut, Missouri, and Nebraska.
Table 4.  Percentage Change in State Grants Based on Three





















% Change with respect to FY2002 allocation
Alabama  $119,993,70 -3.4% -0.9% -3.5%
Alaska 22,199,605 -7.4% -9.0% -16.8%
Arizona 111,045,656 0.9% 11.2% 30.0%
Arkansas 71,962,298 0.5% 0.9% 2.3%
California 781,662,507 -4.1% 1.4% 7.3%
Colorado 94,048,771 -2.7% 3.3% 11.8%
Connecticut 89,245,788 -3.8% -3.8% -14.6%
Delaware 20,345,877 -4.3% -3.7% -4.5%
District of Columbia 10,229,967 19.9% 14.6% 38.1%
Florida 405,996,094 5.2% -0.9% -6.4%
Georgia 195,216,655 1.9% 4.9% 15.5%
Hawaii 25,660,148 8.4% 1.1% 6.6%
Idaho    34,533,972 -1.9% 2.3% 9.6%
Illinois  336,544,669 2.2% -0.9% -4.1%
Indiana 170,908,661 6.3% -0.9% -7.6%
Iowa 82,526,911 2.0% -3.8% -14.7%
Kansas 70,916,463 0.4% -1.0% -2.3%
Kentucky 104,534,421 5.1% -0.9% -5.1%
Louisiana 119,376,775 -4.7% 5.3% 16.4%
Maine 36,989,288 11.9% -9.5% -28.0%
Maryland 131,488,699 -1.0% -0.9% -6.3%
Massachusetts 191,890,947 -1.8% -5.4% -18.3%
Michigan 260,222,966 -1.1% -1.0% 1.5%
Minnesota 128,321,623 -0.5% -2.1% -5.4%
Mississippi 77,199,160 -6.5% -0.8% 2.1%
Missouri 153,553,541 3.9% -2.9% -12.0%
Montana 23,559,507 -5.7% -4.3% -6.0%
Nebraska 50,475,888 -1.5% -3.0% -12.8%
Nevada 41,760,879 6.2% 6.5% 19.2%
New Hampshire 32,080,256 7.4% -2.0% -10.0%
New Jersey 244,340,509 5.4% -5.1% -17.8%
New Mexico 61,594,953 -1.4% -1.8% -7.9%
New York 509,444,136 0.2% -0.9% -6.1%
North Carolina 202,782,236 3.2% -1.0% -0.9%
North Dakota 16,520,608 -4.0% -2.1% -0.6%
Ohio 288,468,284 -4.3% -0.5% 3.0%
Oklahoma 98,502,970 0.9% -0.7% -0.2%
Oregon 86,419,290 -0.4% -1.0% 0.1%
Pennsylvania 281,605,665 -1.1% -1.0% 0.9%
Puerto Rico 67,879,755 12.1% 57.3% 137.2%






















11This amount was $500,000 for FY1998 and has been adjusted for inflation each year since.
South Carolina 115,463,825 6.6% -0.9% -7.6%
South Dakota 19,680,342 -0.7% -0.5% 3.0%
Tennessee 154,805,179 -5.6% -0.8% -2.6%
Texas 608,102,898 -6.1% 0.0% 3.8%
Utah 68,595,427 -8.7% 0.6% 5.6%
Vermont 15,929,020 8.6% -1.4% 0.8%
Virginia 181,315,881 7.4% -0.9% -6.0%
Washington 142,623,221 -3.2% -0.9% 1.5%
West Virginia 51,337,699 13.9% -4.4% -16.1%
Wisconsin 140,642,706 3.4% -1.0% -2.7%
Wyoming 16,711,120 -8.5% -10.6% -20.6%
State Total $ 7,396,818,383 — — —
State Set-asides and Capacity Building Grants.  States are permitted
to reserve funds from their Part B grants for administration and statewide activities,
which include funds for state monitoring, for meeting personnel needs, and for
providing technical assistance and training and development.  Prior to the 1997
Amendments, the state set-aside for these activities had been 25% of the grant.  The
1997 amendments altered this by requiring the amount for these state activities to
be calculated by increasing the prior year reserve by the percentage increase in the
state grant or the rate of inflation, whichever is less.  In recent years, the increases
have been based on inflation because grants are growing considerably faster than
inflation.  The effect of this in recent years has been to ensure state reserves have
kept up with inflation but that higher percentages go to the local level — closer to
85% rather than 75% under prior law.  Of the total state set-aside, states may reserve
up to 20% or an adjusted dollar amount,11 whichever is greater, for administration.
Table 5 illustrates how the state set-asides are calculated, using Alabama as an
example.  The increase over the FY2000 set-aside is based on the rate of inflation
(3.4%) because the overall growth in the state grant (26.5%) was larger.  Increasing
the FY2000 set-aside of $13.7 million by 3.4% results in a total FY2001 state set-
aside of $14.2 million.  Of this amount, Alabama may use up to 20% or $2.8 million
for administration.  The remainder of Alabama’s FY2001 grant of $100.4 million
($86.2 million or 85.8%) is distributed to the local level.
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Table 5.  Example of Calculating State Set-Asides
(for Alabama for FY2001)
Amount of set-aside for administration and
other statewide activities for FY2000
$13.7 million
For FY2001, increase by the lesser of rate of
inflation (3.4%) or percentage increase in
grant (26.5%)
$14.2 million
($13.7 increased by 3.4%)
Up to 20% of state set-aside for
administration
$2.8 million
(20% of $14.2 million)
Amount for other statewide activities $11.4 million
(80% of $14.2 million)
When Part B grants to states increase from one year to the next by more than
the rate of inflation, states are required to set-aside funds for local capacity building
grants (sometimes known as “sliver” grants).  These grants are aimed at improving
LEAs’ special education programs.  Specific uses include:
! Direct services for children with disabilities, including alternative programs
for those expelled from school,
! Addressing needs (such as personnel shortages) identified in the state’s
improvement plan, and
! Adopting effective technology, instructional practices, and materials.
The amount for a state’s capacity building grants is calculated by taking a
percentage of the state’s set aside for the previous year.  The percentage is the
growth rate of the grant minus the inflation rate.  If this amount is less than
$100,000, then the grants would not be made.  Moreover, these grants only are made
with increases above inflation.  If overall grants are not keeping up with inflation,
no capacity building grants are made.  The logic behind this provision is that rather
than providing the full increase for state activities, funds for those activities (as
discussed above) are guaranteed at least an inflationary increase.  But anything over
inflation in the overall increase in the state grant goes to the local level — in this
case, as capacity building grants.  Table 6 illustrates this calculation for Alabama.
CRS-14
12For further information on the IDEA preschool program, see CRS Report RL31273,
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA):  Early Childhood Programs (Section
619 and Part C), by Richard N. Apling.
Table 6.  Example of Calculating State Capacity Building Grants
(for Alabama)
FY2000 state set-aside $13.7 million
Inflation rate 3.4%
Growth rate of state grant from FY2000 to FY2001 26.5%
Capacity building grants total based on prior year
state set-side times growth rate of overall grant minus
inflation (26.5% – 3.4% = 23.1%)
$3.2 million
(23.1% of $13.7 million)
Substate Formula
After the state set asides and the amount (if any) for capacity building grants
are removed, the remainder of the state grant is distributed to LEAs based on a
formula similar to the state formula.  Once the trigger for the permanent formula
went into effect with FY2000 funding, states were required to use a similar substate
formula.
The base grant is calculated for the year prior to the year in which the
permanent formula became effective (i.e., FY1999).  These are not the actual FY99
LEA grants but grant amounts that would have been made if the state allocated 75%
of its total grant that year.  Thus these base grants will be somewhat higher than the
actual FY99 LEA grants.  Of the remainder, 85% is distributed based on LEAs
shares of total public and private school enrollments.  The remaining 15% is
distributed based on shares of their “numbers of children living in poverty, as
determined by the SEA.”  Unlike the state formula there are no minimum or
maximum grant amounts for LEAs.
Preschool State Grant Formula
Section 619 of IDEA authorizes state grants for services to children with
disabilities ages 3 to 5.  Since the Part B grants to states program also permits
funding services for preschool children with disabilities, Section 619 is not so much
a separate IDEA program as a source of additional funds for this age group.12
The preschool formula (in Section 619) is similar to the grants to states formula
except:
! It went into effect immediately in FY1998 after the 1997 Amendments
became effective.  No appropriations trigger had to be reached, as was the
case with the grants to states formula.
! The base grant for each state is the FY1997 grant.
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! The remaining funds are distributed based 85% on states’ shares of total
population ages 3 to 5 and 15% on shares of those in that age group living in
poverty.
! The minimum and maximum grant provisions are similar to the grants to
states formula, except that the 40% maximum grant does not apply.
! State reserves and the substate formula are similar except there is no capacity
building grant provision.
In practice, as Table 7 shows, the formula does not make much difference,
because appropriations have changed very little since 1997 (when funding was
$360.4 million) and not at all for the last 3 fiscal years (which have been level
funded at $390 million).  So most of the grant is based on what was received in
FY1997 — amounts that are not adjusted for changes in children with disabilities
or changes in population.











Alabama $5,730,375 $5,730,375 $5,730,375 0.0%
Alaska 1,294,380 1,294,380 1,294,380 0.0%
Arizona 5,545,066 5,545,066 5,545,066 0.0%
Arkansas 5,479,110 5,479,110 5,479,110 0.0%
California 39,848,701 39,848,701 39,848,701 0.0%
Colorado 5,073,769 5,073,769 5,073,769 0.0%
Connecticut 5,009,888 5,009,888 5,009,888 0.0%
Delaware 1,287,906 1,287,906 1,287,906 0.0%
District of Columbia 253,905 253,905 253,905 0.0%
Florida 18,917,454 18,917,454 18,917,454 0.0%
Georgia 10,077,250 10,077,250 10,077,250 0.0%
Hawaii 1,036,577 1,036,577 1,036,577 0.0%
Idaho 2,233,491 2,233,491 2,233,491 0.0%
Illinois 18,041,307 18,041,307 18,041,307 0.0%
Indiana 9,088,983 9,088,983 9,088,983 0.0%
Iowa 4,077,008 4,077,008 4,077,008 0.0%
Kansas 4,426,665 4,426,665 4,426,665 0.0%
Kentucky 10,431,998 10,431,998 10,431,998 0.0%
Louisiana 6,628,385 6,628,385 6,628,385 0.0%
Maine 2,567,159 2,567,159 2,567,159 0.0%
Maryland 6,824,190 6,824,190 6,824,190 0.0%
Massachusetts 10,103,890 10,103,890 10,103,890 0.0%
Michigan 12,853,643 12,853,643 12,853,643 0.0%
Minnesota 7,587,477 7,587,477 7,587,477 0.0%
Mississippi 4,321,339 4,321,339 4,321,339 0.0%
Missouri 6,171,495 6,171,495 6,171,495 0.0%
Montana 1,215,398 1,215,398 1,215,398 0.0%
Nebraska 2,306,907 2,306,907 2,306,907 0.0%
Nevada 2,312,229 2,312,229 2,312,229 0.0%
New Hampshire 1,591,180 1,591,180 1,591,180 0.0%
New Jersey 11,621,386 11,621,386 11,621,386 0.0%
New Mexico 3,256,045 3,256,045 3,256,045 0.0%
New York 34,473,989 34,473,989 34,473,989 0.0%
North Carolina 11,554,652 11,554,652 11,554,652 0.0%
North Dakota 839,536 839,536 839,536 0.0%
Ohio 12,874,725 12,874,725 12,874,725 0.0%












Oregon 3,960,512 3,960,512 3,960,512 0.0%
Pennsylvania 14,293,994 14,293,994 14,293,994 0.0%
Rhode Island 1,707,269 1,707,269 1,707,269 0.0%
South Carolina 7,293,431 7,293,431 7,293,431 0.0%
South Dakota 1,496,640 1,496,640 1,496,640 0.0%
Tennessee 7,049,034 7,049,034 7,049,034 0.0%
Texas 23,676,158 23,676,158 23,676,158 0.0%
Utah 3,647,879 3,647,879 3,647,879 0.0%
Vermont 892,952 892,952 892,952 0.0%
Virginia 9,323,245 9,323,245 9,323,245 0.0%
Washington 8,343,791 8,343,791 8,343,791 0.0%
West Virginia 3,558,432 3,558,432 3,558,432 0.0%
Wisconsin 9,674,989 9,674,989 9,674,989 0.0%
Wyoming 1,090,450 1,090,450 1,090,450 0.0%
American Samoa 0 0 0 0.0%
Guam 0 0 0 0.0%
Northern Mariana Islands 0 0 0 0.0%
Puerto Rico 3,273,690 3,273,690 3,273,690 0.0%
Virgin Islands 0 0 0 0.0%
Palau 0 0 0 0.0%
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 0.0%
Micronesia 0 0 0 0.0%
Indian Tribe Set Aside 0 0 0 0.0%
Other 0 0 0 0.0%
Total $390,000,0 $390,000,0 $390,000,0 0.0%
Source: ED Budget Service.
Infants and Toddlers State Grant (Part C) Formula
The general purpose of Part C is to aid each state to create and maintain “a
statewide, comprehensive, coordinated, multidisciplinary, interagency system that
provides early intervention services for infants and toddlers with disabilities and
their families.”13  The Part C formula differs from and is less complex than the Part
B formulas.  After setting aside funds for outlying areas and Indian tribes, remaining
funds appropriated for Part C are distributed based on states’ share of infants and
toddlers — i.e., total population below the age of 3.  There is a one-half percent
minimum state grant amount.  Table 8 shows recent state allocations.
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Table 8.  Recent State Allocations for the IDEA Infants and










Alabama $5,442,925 $5,567,271 $6,063,339 8.9%
Alaska 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Arizona 7,163,113 7,326,758 7,868,896 7.4%
Arkansas 3,300,402 3,375,801 3,716,598 10.1%
California 45,929,796 46,979,082 49,954,044 6.3%
Colorado 5,377,332 5,500,179 6,132,874 11.5%
Connecticut 3,992,165 4,083,368 4,478,645 9.7%
Delaware 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
District of Columbia 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Florida 17,645,688 18,048,811 19,235,683 6.6%
Georgia 10,918,523 11,167,962 12,265,577 9.8%
Hawaii 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Idaho 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Illinois 16,151,859 16,520,855 17,822,071 7.9%
Indiana 7,655,126 7,830,010 8,666,617 10.7%
Iowa 3,369,461 3,446,438 3,851,252 11.7%
Kansas 3,433,291 3,511,726 3,884,393 10.6%
Kentucky 4,812,022 4,921,954 5,461,452 11.0%
Louisiana 5,894,220 6,028,876 6,549,059 8.6%
Maine 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Maryland 6,413,677 6,560,200 7,162,997 9.2%
Massachusetts 7,269,022 7,435,086 8,078,494 8.7%
Michigan 12,028,661 12,303,461 13,646,869 10.9%
Minnesota 5,931,008 6,066,505 6,710,076 10.6%
Mississippi 3,786,753 3,873,263 4,213,822 8.8%
Missouri 6,722,152 6,875,722 7,568,706 10.1%
Montana 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Nebraska 2,120,927 2,169,380 2,400,219 10.6%
Nevada 2,652,976 2,713,585 2,970,642 9.5%
New Hampshire 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
New Jersey 9,965,995 10,193,673 11,405,544 11.9%
New Mexico 2,442,953 2,498,764 2,682,058 7.3%
New York 22,320,520 22,830,440 25,063,710 9.8%
North Carolina 9,991,552 10,219,813 11,179,579 9.4%
North Dakota 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Ohio 13,648,077 13,959,873 15,361,800 10.0%
Oklahoma 4,398,814 4,499,306 4,901,951 8.9%
Oregon 4,068,712 4,161,663 4,544,414 9.2%
Pennsylvania 13,016,152 13,313,512 14,662,818 10.1%
Rhode Island 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
South Carolina 4,752,400 4,860,970 5,456,933 12.3%
South Dakota 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Tennessee 6,863,518 7,020,318 7,697,334 9.6%
Texas 30,671,586 31,372,291 33,464,547 6.7%
Utah 3,997,116 4,088,432 4,423,421 8.2%
Vermont 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
Virginia 8,373,127 8,564,414 9,470,434 10.6%
Washington 7,217,290 7,382,172 8,061,958 9.2%
West Virginia 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,068,052 10.1%
Wisconsin 6,078,934 6,217,810 6,961,718 12.0%
Wyoming 1,836,562 1,878,520 2,043,288 8.8%
American Samoa 589,812 603,278 616,106 2.1%
Guam 1,306,168 1,335,989 1,364,398 2.1%
Northern Mariana Islands 392,577 401,540 410,078 2.1%
Puerto Rico 5,782,773 5,914,883 5,986,306 1.2%











14For a discussion of congressional intent with respect to the 1975 Act, see CRS Report 95-
669, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:  Congressional Intent, by Nancy L.
Jones.
15It is important to remember that the maximum funding provision is relevant only to Part
B grants to states.  There is no ‘full funding’ amount for the two other block grants.
16For additional information on IDEA full funding, see CRS Report RL30810, Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA):  Issues Regarding “Full Funding” of Part B Grants
to States, and CRS Report 97-433, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA):  Full
Funding of State Formula, both by Richard N. Apling.
Palau 0 0 0 0.0%
Marshall Islands 0 0 0 0.0%
Micronesia 0 0 0 0.0%
Indian Tribe Set Aside 4,629,630 4,735,395 5,148,148 8.7%
Other 0 0 0 0.0%
Total $375,000,000 $383,567,000 $417,000,000 8.7%
Source: ED Budget Service.
Maximum Funding Under Part B Grants to States
Background, History, and Rationale.  In 1975 when the current version
of federal involvement in special education began,14 Congress wanted to guarantee
the rights of children with disabilities to a free appropriate public education and to
help pay for the additional cost of this education.  At that time, it was thought that
on average these children were twice as expensive to educate as were other children.
Congress wanted to pay some of this additional or excess cost — not the cost
associated with educating all children but the additional cost of educating children
with disabilities.  The national average per pupil expenditure (APPE) was taken as
the measure of total excess cost.  The final compromise in 1975 was for the federal
government to pay up to 40% of this excess cost or 40% of the national APPE.
Specifically the Act stipulates that a state’s maximum grant is 40% of the national
APPE times the number of children with disabilities served.  Full funding of IDEA
Part B grants to states is determined by summing up all the states’ maximum
grants.15  For FY2002 that amount was about $18.2 billion.  It is important to note
that these estimates change — usually they go up, because the estimate of APPE and
of the child count are revised from time to time to reflect estimates of increased
costs and estimated increases in number of children served.16
Recent Full-Funding Proposals.  In recent years, Congress has been
concerned about funding for special education.  This concern can be seen in the
substantial increase in funding of the grants to states program, from $2.3 billion in
FY1996 to $7.5 billion in FY2002 (more than a 200% increase).  Despite recent
increases, some Members of Congress have also been concerned that appropriations
are still far from providing full funding, i.e., maximum state grants authorized by the
statute.  As a result, Congress has taken various actions.  For example, resolutions
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17For example, see H.Con.Res. 84 in the 106th Congress.
18For example, see S. 496 and H.R. 214 in the 107th Congress.  Note that Section 611(j) of
current law would permit full funding to be appropriated at any time.
19For example, see H.Amdt.758 H.R. 4577 The Consolidation Appropriations Act of 2001.
20Congressional Record Daily Version,  no.173, December 13, 2001.  p. H10090.
have been passed calling for full funding.17  Bills have been introduced to specify
authorization levels linked to full funding.18  Floor amendments have been offered
to shift appropriations from other education programs into IDEA funding.19
The Senate-passed version of H.R.1, which became the No Child Left Behind
Act, reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), contained
an amendment to IDEA that would not only have authorized estimated full funding
but would have appropriated specific amounts.  The so-called Harkin-Hagel
amendment would have increased grants to states funding by $2.5 billion per year
beginning in FY2002 until estimated full funding was reached in FY2007.  For the
next 4 years (through FY2011), the amendment would have appropriated estimated
full funding amounts.  Beginning in FY2012, the bill would have authorized such
sums as may be necessary without appropriating funds.
The final conference report (H.Rept. 107-334), which was agreed to by both
the House and the Senate and signed by the President (P.L. 107-110) did not contain
this amendment to IDEA.  Debate in the House and Senate outlined reasons for
dropping the amendment, with the intent to revisit the issue in the context of
reauthorizing IDEA.  For example, Representative Roukema noted the following:
One of the major hurdles in this Conference was the issue of full funding of the
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). Everyone agrees that the federal
government is failing to pay its fair share of the costs of special education and
all sides agree on the need for more money for students with disabilities.  The
problem is that this bill is not the appropriate vehicle to address the IDEA
funding problem because funding and reform must be linked.20
In the Senate, Senator Gregg maintained:
There has been some discussion — and I alluded to not agreeing with my
colleague on some of his opening statement — there has been some discussion
on the issue of IDEA.  This is another area that needs significant attention.  But
the bill we are dealing with today deals with the low-income child and the Title
I program, which is the most significant Federal program in the area of
elementary and secondary school education.
IDEA and special education is a separate issue and should be dealt with as a
separate issue because the IDEA issues are equally complex, maybe narrower,
maybe not as many, but certainly equally as complex and intensely felt as the
title I issues — in fact, more intensely felt in many instances.  To merge the two
and try to solve both of those issues at the same time would have been a
mistake.
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We have put off the IDEA funding issue and the other major questions dealing
with IDEA such as overidentification, especially of minority groups, issues
involving discipline, issues involving excessive attorneys fees, issues involving
excessive bureaucracy being forced on the school systems, issues involving
whether or not a special education child has a right to move out of a public
school and into a private school and the payment for those activities.  All those
programmatic issues which are very intricate and very difficult to address
should be brought up in the context of a full IDEA reform and reauthorization
which will occur next year.21
Some Members listed dropping of IDEA funding as a reason for voting against
the bill.  The 2nd session of the 107th Congress has begun to consider “reforming and
reauthorizing” IDEA.  Both the House and the Senate have held hearings, and the
President has appointed a commission to make recommendations.22  At the same
time, some Members disagree on how much IDEA needs to be changed.23  Others
raise doubts about whether Congress can finish legislation, in less than one year, on
such a sensitive area as special education.24
Possible Unintended Consequences of Full Funding.  As Congress
debates IDEA funding issues, it is important to realize that providing funds for
maximum allowable state grants (i.e., fully funding IDEA Part B grants to states)
may have some unanticipated and unintended consequences.  What follows is a
discussion of some possible results of full funding.
Determining Full-Funding Amounts in Future Years.  As noted above,
the Senate amendment in H.R. 1 would have appropriated specific funds under
Section 611(j).  The amendment would have increased IDEA Part B grants-to-states
appropriations by $2.5 billion per year until an estimated full-funding amount was
reached in FY2007.  Beginning in that fiscal year through FY2011, the Senate
amendment would have appropriated specified amounts that were estimated to be
full funding for those fiscal years.  Those amounts apparently were based on
estimates made by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) in late 2000 or early
2001.  By the end of 2001, new ED estimates were available for those fiscal years,
which indicated that the H.R. 1 appropriations would have been slightly short of full
funding (approximately 38% of APPE rather than 40%).  If a future bill followed the
same strategy of appropriating specific amounts based on estimated full-funding
totals, similar results could occur.
Set-Asides from Total Appropriations.  If funds are appropriated under
Subsection 611(j) (as the Senate version of H.R. 1 would have done), set asides for
outlying areas, BIA, and evaluation would come ‘off the top.’  This could raise two
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problems.  First, slightly less than the full-funding amount would be distributed to
states.  Thus states would receive slightly less than their maximum grants.  Second,
if current percentages were applied, very large amounts would go to BIA and could
go to outlying areas.  Some, including ED, argue that these funds could not be
absorbed and could result in excessive amounts per pupil being provided.  For
example, if the FY2001 full funding amount of $17.8 billion had been provided,
application of the statutory percentage would have allotted nearly $226 million to
the Department of the Interior for the BIA.  Based on a child count of approximately
13,000 children with disabilities attending BIA schools,25 this would have amounted
to more than $17,000 per child; whereas the per child amount provided to states
would have been about $2,800 (40% of the national APPE of $7,006).  Based on a
similar concern given the FY2002 increase in appropriations, ED apparently
persuaded the Congress to override this required percentage through appropriations
language and determine the FY2002 amount for BIA by increasing the FY2001 by
the rate of inflation.
Incentive to Over-Identify Children with Disabilities.  Full funding is
based on providing each state with its maximum allowable grant, which, as noted
above, the Act specifies as 40% of the national average per pupil expenditures times
the number of children with disabilities served.  When funds were distributed based
on numbers of children with disabilities (the ‘interim’ formula in effect until
FY2000 when the ‘permanent’ formula based on population and poverty went into
effect), there was a limit on how many children could be counted for the purpose of
the formula (but not on how many are served).  Prior to the 1997 amendments, the
Act required that, for the purposes of allocations, children with disabilities ages 3
to 17 could represent no more than 12% of a state’s total population in that age
group.  In 1997, this provision was not included; however cross-reference to the
prior law was made with respect to the ‘interim’ formula.  Apparently this reference
does not apply to the maximum grant provision.  Thus there is currently no limit on
how many children with disabilities states could count for the purpose of
determining full funding.  This could encourage ‘over identification,’ which both the
previous Act (under the 12% requirement) and current law (under the ‘census’ based
‘permanent’ formula) seek to avoid.
Constraints on Growth Rates.  As appropriations for the grants-to-states
program grow, the ‘permanent’ formula constrains the growth rate for all states.  If
the overall appropriation grows by more than 15%, state growth rates will fall within
a band between 1.5 percentage points below the overall growth rate26 and 1.5%
percentage points above the overall growth rate.  These constraints are likely to
cause problems if (a) appropriations were to grow at a high rate from one year to the
next (for example, if Congress were to appropriate the estimated full funding
amount all in one year, rather than moving toward full funding in increments, as the
Senate version of H.R. 1 would have done), and (b) in the year in which full funding
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is reached, even under an incremental approach (such as, increases of $2.5 billion
per year, as under the Senate version of H.R. 1).
For example, suppose total appropriations were required to grow by 10% to
reach full funding, even after several years of significant increases.  Some states
would be very close (or even at) full funding in the prior year because, over time,
they had been receiving the higher growth rate (the 1.5 percentage points above the
total growth rate of the appropriations).  Thus these states might need to increase by
only 2% or 3% to reach their maximum grants.  But the minimum they could
increase would be 9.0% (10% times 90% = 9.0%), which would provide a grant
higher than the maximum grant provision would permit.  Other states (those that had
been perennially receiving the lowest growth rate — the 1.5% percentage points
below the overall growth rate in appropriations) would have to increase by
considerably more than 10% to reach their maximum grants.  However, the current
formula limits their growth rate to 11.5% (10% + 1.5%).  One result of these
problems would be that ED would be unable legally to distribute all of the funds
appropriated.  In addition, although sufficient funds would have been appropriated
to provide maximum grants (i.e., full funding) for all states, some could not receive
the full amount because of formula constraints.
Differential Benefits Among States.  The full-funding provision reflects
congressional intent to provide up to 40% of the additional or excess cost of
providing special education and related services to children with disabilities.  The
proxy for excess cost is the national APPE.  However, state APPEs (and presumably
the excess costs of special education) vary widely.  Thus provision of full funding
could result in providing substantially more than 40% of the excess cost in some
(lower cost) states and substantially less than 40% of the excess cost in other (higher
cost) states.
Diminishing Sliver Grants.  Once full funding is reached, the local
improvement grants (the sliver grants–described above) could become modest or
disappear for some states because these grants are based on the difference between
the growth rate of the overall state grant and the rate of inflation.  In the years prior
to reaching full funding, Part B appropriations presumably would be growing
rapidly — outpacing inflation and ensuring relatively large amounts for sliver
grants.  Once full funding is reached, appropriations (if based on full funding) would
grow more slowly, because full funding is partially based on APPE, which in turn
grows at rates related to inflation.  In some smaller states, the state could opt not to
provide any sliver grants at all if the total available is less than $100,000.  In other
states, the amount available could be relatively modest.
Possible LEA-Level Consequences.  Even when full funding for state
grants is reached, grants to LEAs will continue to be determined by the current
substate formula described above.  The resulting substate distributions could have
several consequences at the local level.  First of all, there is no maximum grant
provision for the substate formula.  Thus some LEAs could receive amounts that are
greater than 40% of APPE; others could receive grants that amount to less than 40%
of APPE.  Since the substate formula is based mainly on overall enrollment and
does not reflect local expenditures, some LEAs with lower incidences of children
with disabilities or lower costs could receive more funding than they can spend —
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for example, more than the excess cost of providing FAPE might be covered.  Since
there is a reallocation procedure in the Act (Section 611(g)(4)), which allows states
to redistribute funds if an LEA does not need all the IDEA money to ensure FAPE
for all children with disabilities, this may not become a problem if states exercise
this provision properly.
In addition, current law has state and local fiscal requirements to ensure that
maintenance of effort (MOE) for special education is preserved from year to year
and that the federal funds supplement, not supplant, state and local special education
funding.  If the intent of Congress in providing full funding is to ‘free up’ state and
local special education funding for other purposes, these fiscal provisions could
prevent this from happening.
